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The ways that we have invented for knowing young people are governmentalised.
This governmentalisation produces powerful incentives to conform to the rule-
bound and institutionalised knowledge practices that institutions, government
departments, corporations, and NGOs understand as being capable of telling
truths about young people and about risk. I argue that knowledge practices in the
social sciences should trouble what counts as truth, as evidence, and the ways in
which these truths can be produced.
These interests will be examined through a discussion of the ways in which Tim
Winton’s novel Breath can be read as an allegorical tale about the terror of being
ordinary: and of the teenage years as being a time in a life in which the fear of
being ordinary compels Winton’s key characters to seek out, sometimes stumble
upon that which promises to make their’s a life less ordinary. Here risk is
something that breathes energy and purpose into lifeworlds that are dominated by
the institutionalised ordinariness of family, school, and work. As an allegorical
tale told from the vantage point of hindsight, Breath unsettles what it is that the
social sciences can tell us about youth (as becoming) and risk (as mitigated by
prudential foresight).
Keywords: allegory; social scientific imagination; knowledge practices; youth
at-risk; Breath
Introduction
Pikelet is the main character in Tim Winton’s 2008 novel Breath. Here he is trying to
capture the pleasure and thrill of surfing his first wave as a young man/teenager:
I will always remember my first wave that morning. The way the swell rose beneath me
like a body drawing in air . . . And though I’ve lived to be an old man with my own share
of happiness for all the mess I made, I still judge every joyous moment, every
victory and revelation against those few seconds of living. (Tim Winton 2008, Breath,
pp. 3233)
I will comeback to Pikelet and Breath shortly as I explore the limits and possibilities
of what we can know about young people and risk within the frames of what I will
call governmentalised social science. I want to argue that a social scientific
imagination, understood here as a set of behaviours, practices, and dispositions, as
an ethos, is something that needs to be continually re-enchanted through an ongoing
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troubling of the ways of knowing that we have invented and inherited in the social
sciences.
What I want to explore as I progress here is not so much the possibility, or
otherwise, of doing work outside of the limits and possibilities produced by processes
of governmentalisation. Rather, how can we think and write and re-enchant a social
scientific imagination in ways that unsettle these limits and possibilities? What is
it that we can imagine as knowledge practices in the social sciences at the start of the
twenty-first century? A more particular intervention to be found here is an attempt
to trouble the ways in which we know and imagine young people and risk. In this
context I introduce and discuss some of the work undertaken in a project that
examined the cultural drivers of young people’s risky drinking practices, and
consider some of the limits to knowing that we encountered and discussed in that
project.
It is in this sense that I will suggest that allegory can play some role in unsettling
how it is, as social scientists, that we can capture such things as youth and risk. The
possibilities that allegory provides for knowing youth and risk will be explored in a
reading of Breath as an allegorical tale about the terror of being ordinary, and the
ways in which surfing, sex, and drugs provide the means for Winton’s main
characters, Pikelet, Loonie, Sando, and Eva, to identify, confront, and challenge the
limits shaped by this terror  sometimes with damaging consequences. The fact that
this is a tale told from the vantage point of hindsight makes it a powerful vehicle for
troubling what it is that the social and behavioural sciences can tell us about youth
(as becoming) and risk (as mitigated by prudential foresight).
Hindsight is not understood here as some rose-tinted, sentimentalised vantage
point from which the past can be re-imagined. Rather, it provides a productive,
potentially reflexive, counterpoint from which to unsettle the ways in which
prudential foresight, of the kind imagined in governmentalised social science,
promises to equip young people with the capacities and skills to disenchant and
colonise their futures (Weber 1991).
Young people and risk: governmentalised artefacts of expertise?
Many of my concerns with the limits and possibilities of knowing young people and
risk within a governmentalised social science can be situated in a project that
I conducted with colleagues during 20072008. The project, titled ‘What a great
night!’: the cultural drivers of alcohol use by 14 to 24 year old Australians was a
qualitative, interview-based identification and examination of the cultural practices
(drivers) that could be understood as shaping the low, medium, and high risk use and
consumption of alcohol by young Australians.1
Throughout this discussion I want to engage with some of the research practices
that we debated, developed, and deployed in that project to think about the
possibilities and limitations of the knowledge practices that produce our under-
standings of young people and risk and what counts as evidence and truth. Over a
number of years John Law (2000, 2004) has made a provocative contribution to
ongoing discussions about what he and Law and Mol (2006) identify as knowledge
practices in the social and the hard sciences (see also Haraway 1997, Hacking 1999).
Law (2004) is at pains to stress that traditional knowledge practices craft realities
that, in many instances, produce knowledge, outcomes, and consequences that have
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been, are, important  if not necessary. In our own work investigating the cultural
drivers of young people’s alcohol use and consumption practices, our interviews have
produced data about a range of activities, practices, relationships, settings, feelings,
and rationalisations that appear to have some influence on the ways young people
grow up in the presence/absence of alcohol and develop understandings and
emotional responses to the roles that alcohol plays in their lives (see Hickey et al.
2009, Lindsay et al. 2009, Kelly et al. in press).
But, in many respects  not least of which are my own memories of heavy,
incredibly social, lots of times very funny drinking in my teens, 20s, 30s, 40s  these
knowledge practices seem to come up short in capturing what it is about alcohol
(parties, sessions, meals, trips) that makes it an important part of many people’s lives
(young and old). These issues were topics of conversations as we engaged in what
Law (2004) calls ontological politics about what to include and exclude in our
research design/method assemblage. This struggle, at a fundamental level, was framed
by the institutional, organisational, and evidence-based processes and practices that
structure many of the contract research relationships between university-based
researchers and their customers/clients.
In what follows, a number of these concerns will be addressed through a
discussion of the ways in which Tim Winton’s (2008) novel Breath can be read as an
allegorical tale about the terror of being ordinary. And of the teenage years as being a
time in a life in which the fear  the horror  of being ordinary compels Winton’s key
characters  the teenagers Pikelet and Loonie  to seek out, sometimes stumble
upon, and embrace that which promises to make their’s a life less ordinary. In
Winton’s narrative, a middle-aged Bruce Pike (Pikelet) explores his memories of a
time in his life when he became entangled in a range of highly consequential
behaviours and practices through a complex (damaging?) series of relationships with
the older, ex-champion surfer Sando and his (damaged) partner Eva. In these
recollections risk, danger, harm  to be found, possibly, in increasingly reckless
surfing adventures, drug use, and sexual experimentation  are far from being things
to be rationally calculated or prudently managed with a wary eye to future
consequences. Rather, they breathe energy, excitement, meaning, and purpose into
lifeworlds that, for Pikelet and Loonie, are dominated by the (imagined) institutio-
nalised ordinariness of family, school, and work in the relative isolation of the small,
rural, working class town of Sawyer on the southern coast of Western Australia.
While my concerns here are referenced against the work and discussions we
engaged in during this project I have, over a number of years and in a variety of
spaces, developed an argument that Youth is an artefact of expertise, constructed at
the intersection of a wide range of knowledges about Youth and so-called Youth
issues: an intersection marked by institutionalised (social and behavioural) scientific
representations of crime, education, family, the media, popular culture, (un)employ-
ment, transitions, the life course, risk, and so on. I have suggested that how we
imagine these intersections produces our understandings of Youth. These under-
standings have consequences  material, symbolic, and for a sense of self  in the
lives of young people. As an artefact of expertise, Youth is principally about
becoming: becoming an adult, becoming a citizen, becoming independent, becoming
autonomous, becoming mature, becoming responsible. There is some sense in which
all constructions of Youth defer to this narrative of becoming, of transition.
Journal of Youth Studies 433
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Moreover, there is a sense in which becoming automatically invokes the future
(see the collection edited by Furlong 2009, also Kelly 2000, 2003, 2007).
Youth, as it is constructed in at-risk discourses, is at-risk of jeopardising, through
present behaviours and dispositions, desired futures. These behaviours and disposi-
tions can span an array of spaces, practices, and institutionalised settings: schooling,
work, sexuality, the consumption and use of alcohol and drugs, physical activity, and
diet (see, for example, Parker and Williams 2003, Parker 2005, Gmel et al. 2008,
Kuendig et al. 2008, Miller and Plant 2010). Discourses of Youth at-risk most often
mobilise a form of scientific, statistically based, probabilistic thinking about the
relationships between certain preferred or ideal adult futures and the present
behaviours and dispositions of different populations of young people (Batten and
Russell 1995, Swadener and Lubeck 1995, Withers and Batten 1995). From a
position that draws on the later work of Michel Foucault and the governmentality
literature that has emerged from this work, I have suggested that anxieties and
uncertainties about young people have become increasingly governmentalised
(Foucault 1991, see also the likes of Rose 1999, Bratich 2003, Rose and Miller
2008, Binkley and Capetillo 2009, Peters et al. 2009, Dean 2010, Inda 2010). In this
sense it can be argued that Youth is a concept, is a population, that is rationalised,
institutionalised, and abstracted under the auspices of a constellation of State
agencies, quasi-autonomous non-government organisations, and non-government
organisations. The reflexive constitution of knowledges by Youth Studies expertise
increasingly intersects with management, service delivery, and budget knowledges:
intersections that produce hybridised knowledges about appropriate, economic, and
evidence-based forms of guidance and government of young people and their families.
These knowledges take their form from, and give shape to, the array of youth issues
that exercise the imaginations and governmental (pre)dispositions of the institutio-
nalised risk environments of the twenty-first century (Beck 1992, Kelly 2003). These
institutionalised knowledge practices  which seek to render knowable and make
governable the complex array of behaviours and dispositions that might be imagined
as placing individuals, groups, and populations at-risk  emerge from particular
understandings of what constitutes knowledge, what constitutes data, what
constitutes evidence, and, as a consequence, what constitutes a problem (of youth
at-risk) and what constitutes solutions (to the problem of, for example, young
people and low, medium, high risk drinking behaviours; Watts 1993/1994, Tait 1995,
Stenson 1999).
Risk rationalities work to responsibilise both Youth and the Family (Burchell
1996). Young people are imagined as being responsible for future life chances,
choices, and options within institutionalised risk environments. These processes of
responsibilisation, in which the person is compelled to prudently manage the
institutionally structured and dependent risks of her/his own biography, produce a
field that is ‘characterized by uncertainty, plurality and anxiety, thus continually
open to the construction of new problems and the marketing of new solutions’ by the
array of engineers of the body, mind, and soul that populate the behavioural and
social sciences (Rose 1996c, p. 343, see also Rose 1996 1996a, 1996b).
As I progress here, what I want to explore is not so much the possibility, or
otherwise, of doing work outside of the limits and possibilities produced by processes
of governmentalisation. Rather, how can we think and write and re-enchant a social
scientific imagination in ways that unsettle these limits and possibilities?
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Governmentalised knowledge practices and the limits of the social scientific imagination
In his After Method John Law (2004, p. 1) opens his discussion of knowledge
practices in the social sciences with this quote from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in
Wonderland:
‘There is no use in trying,’ said Alice; ‘one can’t believe impossible things.’ ‘I dare say
you haven’t had much practice,’ said the Queen. ‘When I was your age, I always did it for
half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before
breakfast’.
Taking a lead from the work of Law (2004), and others (see, for example, the
contributions in Law and Mol 2006), I want to suggest that the messiness and
complexity of human experiences and existence requires knowledge practices in the
social sciences that can rethink what counts as knowledge, evidence, truth, and (best)
practice: can rethink the possible and the impossible. If, as Law (2004, p. 2) argues, so
much of the natural, the social, and the cultural is ‘vague, diffuse or unspecific,
slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct’, then can the institutionalised,
even standardised, rule-bound knowledge practices of the social sciences 
quantitative and/or qualitative methods such as interviews, surveys, observations;
forms of representation such as reports, theses, papers, monographs; practices such
as interventions, programs, reviews, audits  capture or create understandings that
can account for these realities? Or do we need to ‘teach ourselves to know some of
the realities of the world using methods unusual to or unknown in social science’
(Law 2004, p. 2)?
I would not want to argue that the governmentalised knowledge practices that
characterise the conduct of contemporary social and behavioural science have no
merit or are unable to craft knowledge that is useful. Earlier I indicated that as we
explored the cultural drivers of young people’s alcohol use and consumption
practices, our interviews produced data that we analysed and presented in a variety of
reports and papers. These texts will join the flows of knowledge that both create, and
try to make sense of, what is, according to many commentators, and what might be
called the drug/alcohol research industry (for example, the Alcohol Education
Foundation, the National Health & Medical Research Council, the Australian Drug
Foundation), a crisis of high risk, binge-drinking by large numbers of young
Australians and young people in the industrialised democracies.
Yet, as I have intimated, these knowledge practices seem to fall short in capturing
what it is about alcohol that makes it an important part of many people’s lives
(young and old). Again, Law (2004) provides a vocabulary with which to think
through and about these dilemmas. This vocabulary explicitly references the ways in
which a range of discourses (poststructuralism and postmodernism, feminism,
studies of science, technology and society) have engaged with the dilemmas of what
we can know, how we can know, and the manner in which such things as gender,
ethnicity, power, and institutionalised relations are always implicated in the know-
ledge practices that enable us to know (anything). For Law, the concept of ‘method
assemblage’ crafts, as he would say, a particular reality about what it is that we do
when we submit a tender for a qualitative, interview-based study of young people’s
drinking biographies, and the roles played by community-based sporting clubs in
shaping young people’s use of alcohol. In the process of tendering for this project, of
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framing a review of the literature, outlining an approach, and suggesting a series of
deliverables we enacted/crafted the realities we set out to explore and analyse. Method
assemblage, in the way Law (2004, p. 144) talks about it (drawing on Deleuze and
Latour), describes a ‘continuing process of crafting and enacting necessary boundaries
between manifest absence and Otherness’. Law uses this concept of method
assemblage to make apparent what he calls the ‘enactment of presence, manifest
absence, and absence as Otherness’. Any method/methodology/assemblage ‘makes
something present by making absence’. The idea of method assemblage tries to make
explicit the ‘crafting, bundling, or gathering of relations’ between what Law identifies
as ‘in-here or present (for instance, a representation or an object); between what is
‘absent but also manifest (it can be seen, is described, is manifestly relevant to
presence)’, and, finally, between what is ‘absent but is Other because, while necessary
to presence, it is also hidden, repressed or uninteresting’.
The potentially limitless character of the Othered in any research design  the
taken-for-granted, the mundane, the repressed, the impossible  is not something to
be ultimately resolved. Thought and un-thought things will always shape any method
assemblage. The very presence of some things will exclude others. The excluded
produces the included. However, in trying to make some of these things explicit or
visible then the crafting of the realities of, say, young people, risk and alcohol, might
look different, might include different things, might allow different things to be
thought, said, done, made possible.
To this point I have canvassed concerns that have, in many respects, a long
history. This is a history of debate that has been characterised by things such as the
critiques of the relationships between truth, art, and science, Max Weber’s ideas
about Science as a Vocation (and related concerns about the rationalisation of our
lifeworlds), and the development by C. Wright Mills (1970) of a challenge to cultivate
a sociological imagination. In his essay Science as Vocation, Max Weber (1991, p. 139)
makes the following comments about processes of intellectualisation, comments that
powerfully capture important elements of my concerns here:
The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an
increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives . . . It means
something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it
at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces
that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have
recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for
whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the
service. This above all is what intellectualization means.
My interests here are also well captured by Foucault in a series of lectures and
interviews late in his life.2 What is of interest in this discussion of the limits and
possibilities of doing sociologies of Youth is Foucault’s argument that enlightenment
should be imagined as an ethos, a disposition that can give shape to the conduct of
intellectual work (see, for example, Kelly and Harrison 2009). In an essay  What is
Enlightenment?  that takes its reference from Kant’s (1784/2007) essay of the same
name Foucault (2007) makes a claim to think of the Enlightenment not in terms of
an historical epoch, nor as a unified, transcendent philosophy, or genera-
lised intellectual or political schema appropriate to understanding and, possibly
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transcending, such an epoch. Rather, enlightenment, for Foucault, invokes a sense of
an attitude or a disposition to the ongoing, permanent task of critique. Enlight-
enment, suggests Foucault (2007, p. 118):
Has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent
body of knowledge that is accumulating; it is to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the
possibility of going beyond them.
So, in sociologies of Youth, indeed in the broader, multidisciplinary field of Youth
Studies, we should try to imagine afresh the sorts of practices, the ways we have
invented and which we consider appropriate for producing knowledge about young
people. I want to suggest that a re-enchantment of a sociological imagination 
understood in the broad sense articulated by C Wright Mills  would seek, as
Zygmunt Bauman and others do, to push the possibilities that irony, ambiguity,
allegory, and metaphor offer for knowledge practices in twenty-first century social
sciences: would challenge the limits of what counts as evidence, as truth, as knowing
in the governmentalised spaces in which we produce and enact knowledge. Bauman,
possibly as much, if not more than many contemporary social scientists, has
provocatively and vigourously embraced the challenge to re-enchant a sociological
imagination (Elliott 2007, pp. 318). Bauman’s (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a
and 2008b) prolific, innovative, and suggestive cultural sociologies of liquid life have
opened up a range of possibilities for exploring the globalised social, cultural,
economic, and political landscapes of the twenty-first century. For Bauman (1997,
p. 119), a cultural sociology of liquid life is informed by a sociological imagination
that embraces a ‘tolerance and equanimity towards the wayward, the contingent, the
not-wholly determined, the not-wholly understood and the not-wholly predictable’.
This deliberate inconclusiveness, provocation, and references to texts, ideas, and
sources outside of what might be called mainstream sociology is framed by Keith
Tester (2007) in terms of irony, and in a re-reading and re-enchantment of the
sociological imagination. For Tester (2007, p. 90), Bauman’s work sits  comfortably
for some, less so for others  in a sociological tradition ‘that is ironic about the status
of sociology’. Such a disposition ‘sees no reason to avoid certain books simply
because they are found in different parts of the library, and which is concerned to
recover the ambiguity of the human adventure from any trap into which it might fall
or be pushed’. It is readily apparent, suggests Tester (2007, p. 83), that Bauman’s
sociologies of postmodernity and liquid life are ‘inspired to a considerable degree by
literature’. For Bauman: Understanding human dilemmas and torments is not the
sociologists’ privilege. Learning sociological methods may guarantee a job, but not
wisdom and insight . . . I personally learned more about the society we live in from
Balzac, Zola, Kafka, Musil, Frisch, Perec, Kundera, Beckett . . . than, say, from Parsons
(cited in Tester 2007, p. 83, my emphasis). Moreover, Tester (2007, p. 85) claims that
‘Bauman’s commitment to literature as a tool of irony, and therefore of the unsettling
of the determinations of common sense’, is illustrative of his conviction that ‘the
sociological imagination is quite independent of the discipline of sociology. One can
be a paragon of the discipline and possess no sociological imagination whatsoever’.
It is in this sense that Tester (2007, p. 82) locates Bauman’s work in a European
literary tradition that is fundamentally concerned with an:
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Exploration of how the meaning of the world has been transformed, from the place of
wide open adventure into which Don Quixote rode, to the place of petty yet life-
threatening officialdom and administrative opacity in which Kafka’s unheroic heroes
are consigned to dwell. How has it been that the transformation of a man into a beetle,
which for Don Quixote would have been a call to arms . . . has become just one more
family embarrassment?
Breath: allegory and re-enchanting the social scientific imagination?
For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another  from the
political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative
assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the
military establishment; from the considerations of an oil industry to studies of
contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote
transformations to the most intimate features of the human self  and to see
the relations between the two. (C. Wright Mills, 1970, The Sociological Imagination,
pp. 1314)
It is in this sense that I want to consider that possibilities that allegory offers for
unsettling the governmentalised knowledge practices that produce the truths of
youth and of risk. Allegory, suggests Law (2004, pp. 8889), is the ‘art of meaning
something other and more than what is being said’. Meaning something more
requires that allegory also invokes the ‘art of decoding that meaning, reading
between the literal lines to understand what is actually being said’. Allegory, in part
because of its often close affinity with metaphor and irony, can be powerful in
gesturing towards what might not be apparent at first glance. What is not, at first
glance, apparent can strike us as profoundly truthful as its possible meanings emerge
or materialise under a particular gaze. Allegory ‘uses what is present as a resource to
mess about with absence. It makes manifest what is otherwise invisible. It extends the
fields of visibility, and crafts new realities out-there’. Often, also, it has the capacity
to do ‘something that is even more artful. This is because it makes space for
ambivalence and ambiguity. In allegory, the realities made manifest do not
necessarily have to fit together’ (Law 2004, p. 90).
Law (2004, p. 88) argues that allegory is, in many ways, a lost art-form when so
much of the representational logics and practices of Anglo-European settings are
dominated by particular, and limited, ideas about description, analysis, prescription,
and generalisation. The social sciences, media commentary, and policy pronounce-
ments  about young people, risk, and alcohol, for example  gain weight and
credence when they are imagined as being objective, transparent, rational, and
evidence-based. So what is true about young people, alcohol, and risk is that which
can be written about, talked about from an evidence base that is produced from
approved data gathering practices. As Law (2004, p. 88) suggests: ‘Descriptions
describe directly. This is the goal, and seemingly the achievement, of many or most of
the dominant forms of representation in Euro-America’. But this achievement is not
necessary. It is, indeed, an achievement within particular social, economic, political,
and technological configurations. It is an achievement that relies on a number of
relationships, a number of presences and absences including the following: the
appearance of evidence-based, scientific representations denies space to other forms
of apparently less rigourous, less clear, less practical representations (including
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metaphor, irony, allegory): all representation is, at some levels, allegorical because all
representation is, at some level, mediating/mediated: direct, evidence-based repre-
sentation is, in this sense, ‘allegory that denies its character as allegory’ (Law 2004,
pp. 8889).
As Charles Sarno (2004) argues, allegory, employed explicitly or implicitly in the
works of the likes of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel has a long tradition in the
textual practices of the social sciences. More recently, the work of James Clifford has
been influential in making explicit the role of these textual practices in ethnographic
writing. Clifford (1986, pp. 99100) argues that ethnographic texts, the stories they
tell, are ‘inescapably allegorical’, that allegory is, indeed, a condition of the
meaningfulness of the text. For Clifford, a recognition of this condition makes clear
the ‘fact that realistic portraits, to the extent that they are ‘‘convincing’’ or ‘‘rich’’ are
extended metaphors, patterns of association that point to coherent (theoretical,
esthetic [sic], moral) additional meanings’.
Tim Winton’s novels  including Cloudstreet (1991), The Riders (1994), Dirt
Music (2001), and his latest, Breath (2008)  are international best sellers and award
winners. One reviewer of Breath hints at the appeal of these stories: ‘His work is
preoccupied with wounded or troubled characters, often haunted by their past, who set
out on actual or psychological journeys in search of purpose, meaning, and redemption’
(McDonald 2008, p. 19, my emphasis). These themes are not unique to Winton’s
work. In spite of his popularity and critical acclaim these truths do not speak to all.
They also do not answer to social scientific ways of understanding, describing,
analysing, or generalising what it is to be human. But they are powerful on their own
terms, especially as allegory. As another reviewer of Breath suggests:
Who would have thought that a novel about an extreme sport, surfing the wild swells
and sets off the south-western coast of Australia, would be about nothing less than the
infirm glory of the human condition and the damage left in the wake of tasting the limits
set for our human frame? Tim Winton’s Breath is as much a novel about surfing as The
Old Man And The Sea is about fishing and Moby Dick about whale-hunting.
(Mukherjee 2008, my emphasis)
In reading Breath we can read a story about family and school life, about the
pleasures and pains of friendships, of being young, being male, of youthful
adventures, surfing, and sex. Read differently, with what might be called a social
scientific imagination, we can read a tale that is about so much more. A tale that
might not necessarily be real, but which may be profoundly truthful in terms of the
ways in which it provokes us to imagine how some young people experience the limits
and possibilities of the ordinariness and banality of everyday life: an ordinariness
that emerges from, and shapes, the particular institutionalised lifeworlds of a remote,
rural, working class town on the southern coast of Australia. In Breath Winton
enacts realities in which knowing something of young people and risk is embodied, is
emotional, is situated, is allegorical (Law 2004). In the space available here these ways
of knowing can only be briefly illustrated, but what they indicate, allude to, are
things such as the following.
Risk and danger can be felt and experienced in ways that heighten the experience
of being alive, of drawing breath. For some, the institutionalised ordinariness of
everyday lifeworlds weighs heavily on what it means to live a life. For Pikelet and
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Loonie the mundane, ordinary limits of a life shaped by dominant, in some settings
almost frozen, understandings of masculinity/femininity, age, family, school,
and work are things that can be challenged by the experiences to be found at the
limits of skill and understanding that are promised first by surfing, then by drugs and
sex:
For all the years when Loonie and I surfed together, having caught the bug that first
morning at the point, we never spoke about the business of beauty. We were mates but
there were places our conversation simply couldn’t go. There was never any doubt about
the primary thrill of surfing, the huge body-rush we got flying down the line with the
wind in our ears. We didn’t know what endorphins were but we quickly understood how
narcotic the feeling was, and how addictive it became; from day one I was stoned from
just watching. (pp. 2324)
Yet, for many of Pikelet and Loonie’s peers, as Winton powerfully illustrates, these
limit experiences are to be avoided (not even imagined). Ordinariness, and the rules
of belonging that shape being ordinary, provide a refuge for some young people,
and a more secure sense of self in the face of the institutions, uncertainties, and
possibilities that shape their lives (see Brookes 2009, also Walkerdine 1990). In this
sense the ways in which Pikelet and Loonie embrace that which promises to make
them, their lives, less ordinary are things that are not necessarily generalisable or
translatable into the thinking and actions of their peers or, indeed, into the adults
and adult institutions that shape their (young) lifeworlds. Pikelet’s parents, like
many adults in the contexts created by Winton, appear to have embraced the
mundane and the ordinary as a means to account for the costs that can be
associated with life’s perils  to be found, in Sawyer, in the ocean, the bush, or the
workplace:
I grew up in weatherboard house in a mill town and like everyone else there I learnt to
swim in the river. The sea was miles away but during big autumn swells a salty vapour
drifted up the valley at the height of the treetops . . .
My father was afraid of the sea and my mother seemed indifferent to it and in this they
were typical of the place. It was the way most locals were when I was a boy, and they
were equally as anxious about the forest around us . . .
On Sundays blokes from the sawmill liked to row all the way down to the broad shallows
of the inlet to fish for whiting and flathead and my father went with them . . . He began
to take me along when I was seven . . . The other men were always tired and hungover,
but my old man was just naturally subdued. When any of them spoke up they had the
barking tone of the industrial deaf. They had fags-and-sawdust coughs, those men.
Their jungle hats stank of prawns and fishblood. They were bachelors and returned
soldiers and bank-beaten farmers who seemed oddly solicitous of my father even if they
did mock him for his teetotal ways. He was a greengrocer’s boy from a village in Kent
who never told me stories about his old life. But he was no mystery to his workmates. He
was, simply put, a steady hand and as far as I could see this was all they required of him.
(pp. 910)
It is this steadiness  this ordinariness that is characteristic of the institutionalised,
adult environments of work, of marriage and relationships, of a daily life that is
attractive or desirable because it is routine, dependable  that threatens to suck the
breath out of life for Pikelet and Loonie:
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I couldn’t have put words to it as a boy, but later I understood what seized my
imagination that day. How strange it was to see men do something beautiful. Something
pointless and elegant, as though nobody saw or cared . . . In Sawyer . . . men did solid,
practical things, mostly with their hands . . . there wasn’t much room for beauty in the
lives of our men. (p. 23)
Risk and danger and what these might mean and the possibilities they provoke, the
limits they transgress, are not always generalisable across time and space: they may,
indeed, be situated in very particular configurations of time, space, and place. To a
middle-aged man exploring his memories, they are things that look very different
from the ways they appear from the standpoint of a young man struggling against
what is seen to be the monotony, the sheer ordinariness of breathing:
More than once . . . I’ve wondered whether the life-threatening high jinks that Loonie and
I and Sando and Eva got up to in the years of my adolescence were anything more than a
rebellion against the monotony of drawing breath. It’s easy for an old man to look back
and see the obvious, how wasted youth and health and safety are on the young who spurn
such things, to be dismayed by the risks you took, but as a youth you do sense that life
renders you powerless by dragging you back to it, breath upon breath upon breath in an
endless capitulation to biological routine, and that the human will to control is as much
about asserting power over your own body as exercising it on others. (p. 41)
Risk and danger can be easily, accidentally stumbled into; embraced out of emotions
(embodied feelings) as diverse as fear or joy; rationally and prudently identified,
weighed up and calculated (or not!) in situations and relationships that have a range
of characteristics. These may be dependent, peer-based, characterised by bravado,
shaped by masculinity and femininity, provoked by a need to belong, a desire to feel
alive, a hunger not to be  a horror of being  ordinary.
When Pikelet, Sando, and Loonie attempt to surf a massive, un-surfed, off-shore
break called Nautilus Pikelet, unlike Sando and Loonie, cannot summon the courage
to take on the ugly wall of water:
I was gutted by that day at Nautilus. A small, cool part of me knew it was stupid to have
been out there trying to surf a wave so unlikely, so dangerous, so perverse . . . Surely
there were better and bigger waves to ride than that deformity. (p. 146)
After that first conquest of Nautilus, Loonie and Sando hatched plans to do it again,
plans that excluded Pikelet:
We never broached the subject of whether I’d accompany them. God, knows, I should have
been relieved, but I was inconsolable. I knew any reasonable person would have done what
I did out there that day. Which was exactly the problem: I was, after all, ordinary. (p. 147)
In the next few months a gulf opens between Pikelet and the other two, a gulf that
sees Sando take the slightly older Loonie with him on a surfing trip to Java. This gulf
and absence opens a space in which a potentially risky, dangerous sexual relationship
can develop between Pikelet and Eva. Boredom, loneliness, listlessness, and feelings
of ordinariness conspire to send Pikelet out to the house after Sando and Loonie had
left for Java. Winton tells a story of how a somewhat predatory and, possibly,
spiteful, but more likely lonely and abandoned Eva, seduces an inexperienced, inept,
fumbling Pikelet:
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And so began a pattern. Eva always seemed more vindicated than pleased to see me. Sex
was a hungry, impatient business, more urgent for the looming possibility of Sando’s
unscheduled return . . . Rain drummed on the roof. I was trembling.
You’re scared, she said.
No.
Bullshit.
Just cold, I said.
That’s okay. Being scared is half the fun. You should know that by now. (p. 167)
The act of drawing breath, the process of breathing and the consequences of not, are
combined with the horror of ordinariness, the need to find and embrace that which
marks one as not being ordinary, in the life that Winton breathes into Pikelet. The
banality, the sheer ordinariness of breathing takes on new dimensions when the sexual
relationship between Pikelet and Eva evolves into Pikelet’s introduction to Eva’s auto-
erotic asphyxiation fetishes. While we are left to guess at much about the role of these
fetishes in Eva’s life, we can imagine their connections (conscious or otherwise) to her
craving for the danger, the fear, the risk to be found at the limits of life itself, at the
limits of drawing breath. This uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk profoundly scares
Pikelet, but he is drawn into Eva’s dangerous desires despite himself:
From the bottom of the wardrobe she brought out a strap and a pink cellophane bag.
The strap had a collar and a sliding brass ring. I snorted nervously, waiting for the
joke . . .
I don’t get it, I said.
I’ll show you she murmured.
What if I don’t want to?
Then I’ll be disappointed, I guess . . .
So, I said. Show me.
You know how to hyperventilate, right?
I nodded warily.
Well, it’s kinda like that . . .
You hang yourself?
Sure. Sometimes.
Fuck. Why?
Because I like it.
But why do you like it?
Because, little man, she said flipping it at me playfully. It makes me come like a freight
train. (pp. 180181)
The consequences for Pikelet of his stumbling into these fetishistic practices are
immediate but also echo throughout his life. These echoes give structure to Winton’s
narrative. The unfolding story leads us to the spaces in which a middle-aged man
reflects on a life that is profoundly shaped by consequences not imagined in the
moments when he felt really alive at certain times in his youth.
Finally: allegory, hindsight and the social scientific imagination
Part of the power of Winton’s narrative is, for me, that it is a story told from the
vantage point of middle-age. From this standpoint  hindsight  we can selectively
review a life and identify and locate missed opportunities, successes, failings,
thwarted ambitions, unrealised dreams, unfulfilled fantasies. At the end of the
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story the middle-aged Bruce Pike reflects on a life marked by personal loss, a
broken marriage, physical and mental breakdown, and some sort of parlous
redemption:
I didn’t exactly pull myself together . . . but bits of me did come around again, as flies
or memories or subatomic particles will for reasons of their own. Bit by bit
I congregated . . . and then somehow I cohered. I went on and had another life. Or
went ahead and made the best of the old one. (p. 211)
In the discussions about the ontological politics that shaped our research our own
youth, our own memories, were an explicit, but often, also, unspoken dimension of
our discussions about culture, young people, and alcohol. We enacted and told
stories about our experiences growing up with alcohol, the drinking, the parties, the
fun, the intense sociability, the stupid things we did, the risks, the almost complete
lack of focus on future consequences or possibilities. As adult participants in
governmentalised social science we explored the dilemmas, limits, and possibilities of
how we could know and imagine young people, alcohol, and risk.
Winton’s use of hindsight, of memory, provides Bruce Pike with the opportunity
to reflect on and reconstruct a past with a certain worldliness, an insightfulness, a
sense of possibilities  lost and taken. As a technique that enables Breath to work as
allegory, hindsight provides us with a vantage point that we don’t possess in the now,
in the moments when we choose, embrace, stumble upon things that may be far
reaching in consequence and significance  when we are young and/or old. Yet, as we
have seen, so much of social/behavioural science, policy, and service delivery
discussions construct risky practices in ways that suggest that current generations
of young people ought to have developed a risk aware, prudent, responsible
disposition to present practices and future consequences. Ought to be able, with
foresight, to imagine and colonise their futures in ways that can guard against
damage, hurt, and pain. To, in effect, dis-enchant their presents and futures. To
render them amenable to calculation, guided by expertise, informed by evidence.
Youth Studies, then, emerges from institutionalised spaces that demand
particular approaches to knowledge production. These demands are not necessarily
bad, as Foucault (1983) might say, but they do place limits on the ways that are
considered appropriate for producing knowledge that is understood as useful. In
these domains some can speak and others can’t. Some things can be said and done
and others can’t. Certain ideas, stories, ways of producing knowledge are just
impossible to imagine as being useful, truthful, evidence-based: and useful in these
contexts signals something that is performative or able to be operationalised by
various agencies in settings that may be remote and abstracted from the times/spaces/
places where knowledge is produced (Lyotard 1984).
Law (2004, p. 92) argues that in our everyday, sense-making existence we are all 
expert and non-expert, scientist and artist  ‘allegorists’. We ‘read between the lines
and manifest realities that are not being spoken about in as many words’. We
unsettle, interfere with the ‘boundaries between that which is Othered and that which
is manifest’. In this way we can imagine that as allegorists we are, much of the time,
‘crafting and manifesting realities that are non-coherent, that are difficult to fit
together into a single smooth reality’. The promise of allegory is that it can make us
less certain of what we think we know about young people and risk. This uncertainty
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might provoke us to explore how those things that are absent, Othered, impossible
might contribute to our understanding if they could be imagined as possible. Breath,
by itself has its own limits. The roles that such allegorical tales may play in shaping
accounts of young people and risk is dependent on the associations that they can
establish, the meaningfulness that they can add, to other ways of knowing young
people and risk (Clifford 1986). When we do social science we become literalists. We
employ knowledge practices that aim for, and gain credence from, a capacity to
describe, analyse, and represent things directly, truthfully. The particular power of
Breath is that it is an allegorical tale that is situated, embodied, and told from the
vantage point of hindsight. A tale told from the vantage point of hindsight can be a
powerful vehicle for unsettling what it is that the social and behavioural sciences can
tell us about youth (as becoming) and risk (as mitigated by prudential foresight). The
tales told here can situate an array of what we might imagine as risky practices in an
always uncertain relationship to particular emotional, psychological, and cultural
responses to the horror of being ordinary  whatever that might mean in the diverse
institutionalised lifeworlds that shape young people’s lives. How far the truths of this
tale about surfing, about growing up in relative remoteness and isolation, about the
horror of ordinariness travel from these spaces is something that can’t be determined
by my reading.
So, I want to close with what English critic James Wood (2008, pp. 178179)
suggests that we might find if we go looking for meaning and knowledge in practices
other than the ones we are often encouraged, even compelled, to use in the practice
of twenty-first century social science. He argues that: ‘the question of fiction’s
referentiality  does fiction make true statements about the world?  is the wrong
one, because fiction does not ask us to believe things (in a philosophical sense) but to
imagine them (in an artistic sense)’. In this sense, imagining ‘the heat of the sun on
your back is about as different an activity as can be from believing that tomorrow it
will be sunny. One experience is all but sensual, the other wholly abstract’.
This sense of imagination provides a means to move beyond the problematic
arena of reality, to a sometimes more problematic notion of truth. If, as Wood (2008,
p. 180), suggests we ‘throw the term ‘‘realism’’ overboard, we can account for the
ways in which, say, Kafka’s Metamorphosis and Hamsun’s Hunger and Beckett’s
Endgame are not representations of likely or typical human activity, but are
nevertheless harrowingly truthful texts’. In truth, if not in reality, we can imagine
‘what it would feel like to be outcast from one’s family, like an insect (Kafka), or a
young madman (Hamsun), or an aged parent kept in a bin and fed pap (Beckett)’.
And so as we encounter a variety of texts and representations we can stumble
upon what Wood (2008, p. 184) calls the ‘blue river of truth’: the space in which we
might engage ‘scenes and moments and perfectly placed words in fiction and poetry,
in film and drama, which strike us with their truth, which move and sustain us, which
shake habits’ house to its foundations’. It is in these moments, in these encounters
with the likes of Pikelet and Eva, that we might realise the potential for
understanding what it means to be human that is promised by Mills’ sociological
imagination, but which is oftentimes thwarted by the governmentalised knowledge
practices that characterise the social sciences at the start of the twenty-first century.
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2. This is a series that is positioned in some circles as a recanting by Foucault of his supposed
anti-Enlightenment sensibilities and dispositions. This is not a debate to enter or outline at
this point (see Nehamas 2000, O’Leary 2002, Paras 2006, Rajchman 2007).
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